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BOOK REVIEW
Standards Without Goals
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA
FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM.

By

PIERCE O'DONNELL,* MICHAEL J.

E. CURTIS.*** New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1977. Pp. xvi, 137. $16.95.
CHURGIN,**

AND

DENNIS

Reviewed by Andrew von Hirsch****

A considerable literature has developed since the beginning of
this decade on the need for, and contents of, sentencing and parole2
release standards.' California has adopted sentencing standards, 3
and Minnesota and Pennsylvania are in the process of doing so.
The federal system, Oregon, and Florida have adopted laws which
call for guidelines for parole release decisions. 4 More jurisdictions

are expected to follow suit.
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Consultant, Senate Subcommittee on
Administrative Practice and Procedure.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
***Director of Clinical Studies, Yale Law School.
****Professor, Graduate School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark.
A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1960, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE
(1971); D. FOGEL, ".... WE ABE THE LIVING PROOF . . ." (1975); M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES (1973); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); J.Q. WILSON, THINKING
ABOUT CRIME (1975); Harris, Disquisition on the.Need for a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning Systems, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 263 (1975).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978). The statute prescribes
presumptive sentences for various offenses. For a description, see Cassou &
Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California:The New Numbers Game, 9 PAC. L.
J. 5 (1978).
3. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 723, 1978 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 705 (West); Act
of Nov. 26, 1978, Act No. 319, 1978 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1054 (Purdon) (to be codified in
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1321, 1381-1382 (Purdon)). Both statutes establish a
sentencing commission, which is required to formulate sentencing guidelines.
4. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (1976);
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 947.165 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 144.75 (1977).
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Toward A Just and Effective Sentencing System is designed to
promote and guide this movement. 5 It is based on discussions at a
clinical workshop, conducted in 1974 and 1975 at Yale Law School,
which addressed problems of sentencing and parole in the federal
system. The workshop included a number of distinguished scholars, judges and other officials 6-and is, for that reason alone, worth
examining seriously.
In analyzing the results, it is important to remember that the
workshop was held more than four years ago, when it was still essential to make a reasoned case why standards for sentencing
should exist at all. The first part of the book makes the case eloquently, 7 an important contribution in itself.
Now that the idea of setting standards has gained momentum,
however, it is critical to look carefully at how the standards should
be constructed. The second part of the book8 is devoted to three
specific proposals: a new "lockstep" procedure that judges would
be required to follow in imposing sentences; a sentencing commission for setting guidelines; and elimination of parole release. I shall
deal with the report's recommendations as though they were being
proposed today-recognizing that in the years since the workshop
was held, some of the participants may have altered their views.
Any criticism of the report's proposals is not to minimize the service that the workshop has provided by placing its participants' influence on the side of having standards.
THE PROPOSED "LOCKSTEP" PROCEDURE: WHY IT FAILS
The "lockstep" procedure9 is the book's main recommendation

for alleviating the problem of sentencing disparity. It requires
judges successively to consider each of four purposes for sentenc5. The authors also propose a comprehensive federal sentencing statute, set
forth in Appendix A to the study. P. 96 app.
6. The distinguished workshop participants included: United States District
Court Judges Marvin E. Frankel (retired) and Jon 0. Newman; Maurice H.
Sigler, former chairperson of the United States Parole Commission; Peter B.
Hoffman, research director of the Parole Commission; Ronald Gainer, a high-ranking
official in the United States Department of Justice; and Professors Stanton Wheeler
and Daniel J. Freed of Yale Law School. Preface, p. xii. The authors of this report,
themselves participants in the workshop, endeavored "to arrive at a consensus position consistent with the views of individual workshop participants and responsive to
the pressing need for reform legislation." Preface, p. xii.
7. Pp. 1-30.
8. Pp. 33-75.
9. Pp. 43-49, 52-53; Proposed Statute § 2302(d), pp. 107-10.
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ing-deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and "denunciation"' 0
-and to decide what penalty-fine, probation, or imprisonmentis necessary to accomplish each of the purposes for a particular defendant." The judge, therefore, will make four separate determinations, each representing his or her perception of the punishment
necessary to reach each sentencing goal. The sentence imposed
would be the largest of the four amounts assigned to the four
purposes.

12

The purported advantage of this procedure is that it requires
all sentencing judges to go through a similar reasoning process in
deciding their sentences. The procedure avoids difficult moral
judgments about which of the four penal aims are to be considered
preeminent; instead, all four aims would be deemed worth taking
into account.
Nonetheless, as a technique for ensuring consistency, the
lockstep procedure has little value. An illustration reveals its inadequacies. Suppose two offenders, each with similar criminal histories
and social backgrounds, are convicted of similar crimes-for example white-collar frauds. The two individuals come before different
judges for sentencing. Under the lockstep procedure, each judge
must successively consider the same four purposes of punishment.
However, they are permitted to make their own, perhaps startlingly different, judgments about how much punishment is needed
to accomplish each purpose. Suppose Judge A is a great believer in
the efficacy of deterrence, while Judge B thinks imprisonment is
useful principally as an incapacitant for offenders likely to return to
crime. The two judges will, under the proposed procedure, impose
quite disparate sentences. When considering the first purpose, deterrence, Judge A assigns two years imprisonment because he or
she believes this will help deter white-collar frauds; Judge B opts
for a noncustodial penalty, because he or she doubts imprisonment
is a useful deterrent in such cases. When considering the second
purpose, incapacitation, Judge A opts for a nonincarcerative penalty, because he or she thinks the criminogenic effects of prison
generally outstrip its incapacitative value. Judge B doubts that pris10. The report defines "denunciation" as "the development of internal moral
restraints and respect for law in members of the general population through the use
of criminal sanctions as an educative, moralizing tool." P. 48 (quoting Proposed Statute § 2302(a)(4), p. 107).
11. P. 44.
12. P. 52; Proposed Statute § 2302(d)(5), p. 109.
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ons are "schools for crime" in the case of white-collar offenders,
but thinks, nevertheless, that incapacitation is unimportant in this
case because the defendant seems unlikely to recidivate. Both
judges are skeptical of the rehabilitative and denunciatory value of
imprisoning in such cases, and assign a nonprison disposition to
these two purposes.
What is the result? The sentence is supposed to be the largest
of the four amounts assigned to any of the four purposes. Judge A
thus imposes a two-year prison term, reflecting the two years he or
she assigned to deterrence; Judge B imposes a noncustodial sentence, since he or she did not assign a prison term to any of the
four aims. Yet the two cases are ex hypothesi similar: The diverse
outcomes stem only from differences in the two judges' outlook.
Consistency is not achieved, and one wonders whether the procedure is really more "rational" since it does not illuminate how the
various purposes are to be assessed.
THE SENTENCING COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES:
THE NEED FOR SYSTEMWIDE DECISIONMAKING

If the "lockstep" procedure cannot alleviate disparity, do the
authors supply anything else? The report endorses another proposal made several years earlier by Judge Marvin Frankel: to establish a rulemaking body known as a sentencing commission to
promulgate sentencing guidelines.13 Judges would be required to
consider these guidelines in determining sentences.' 4 If the judge's
proposed disposition fell within the guideline ranges, the judge
would need only give a brief statement of his or her reasons; 15 if it
fell outside the guidelines, a fuller explanation would be re6
quired.'
Judge Frankel's suggestion of a sentencing commission is a valuable idea, which a number of penologists (myself included) have
supported. 17 However, if such a body is to be created, one must
13. Pp. 14, 35, 44, 73-75; Proposed Statute §§ 2501-2504, pp. 111-15. The idea
of establishing a sentencing commission was first proposed in M. FRANKEL, supra

note 1, at 118-23.
14. P. 53.
15.

P. 59; Proposed Statute § 2302(d)(6)(A), p. 94.

16. Pp. 53, 59; Proposed Statute § 2302(d)(6)(B), p. 109.
17. For comments by various scholars and officials on the creation of a sentencing commission, see Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings on S. 1437

Before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. My
own comments on the proposal are set forth in id. at 8977-80.
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address what kind of standards it should write. Here, the authors
are strangely silent. What purpose or purposes should the
guidelines seek to achieve? What offender and offense characteristics should normally determine outcome under the guidelines?
How lenient or severe should the various penalty gradations be?
How narrow or broad should the guideline ranges be? What kind
of considerations make it appropriate to depart from the
guidelines? There is no discussion or recommendations on any of
these critical subjects-and that diminishes the report's value.
A guidelines system is likely to succeed only if it adopts an approach quite different from the "lockstep" procedure which the
book suggests judges should use. Instead of focusing on the purposes to be achieved in the case of this or that individual defendant, the drafters of the guidelines should address the purposes the
system as a whole should seek to achieve. How much weight
should be given to the blameworthiness of offenders' conduct-and
how much should be given to the likelihood of their returning to
crime-are matters to be considered in constructing the system.
The guidelines must prescribe a consistent body of principles; they
must provide an overview, not just recipes for case-by-case decisions.
Once the rulemaker has determined the system's purposes, it
should develop specific criteria to implement them. Those criteria,
instead of inviting the judge to interpret this or that purpose in the
individual case, should call on him or her to consider designated
items of information about the offender and offense. The guidelines
would indicate how much weight ought ordinarily be given the
various items, and what penalties or ranges of penalties should presumptively be imposed. This will preserve judicial discretion for
dealing with the unusual cases and yet promote consistency in
ways the "lockstep" cannot: each judge will be utilizing similar criteria, and giving prima facie consideration to similar items of information.
Recalling our illustration of the two white-collar offenders,' 8
the question of purposes should thus be resolved at a systemwide
level. Judges A and B would be called upon, not to make individualized judgments about what will deter or rehabilitate these criminals, but to consider specified factors (relating to the seriousness of
their crimes, the extent of their criminal histories and-depending
on the system's rationale-perhaps other factors) to which the
18. See text following note 12 supra.
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guidelines would assign a specified degree of importance.
Which factors the guidelines should utilize would depend on
the assumed purposes of the system. One could, as I have urged
elsewhere, 19 utilize a "just deserts" model, in which the blameworthiness of the criminal conduct would be given paramount consideration. Another possibility would be the more "mixed" model that
Norval Morris has proposed: Desert, that is, gravity of the criminal
conduct, would determine the upper and lower bounds of the
amount of punishment; within those limits, the specific penalty
would be chosen on other grounds, such as deterrence. 20 Still another model would be the one developed by the United States
Parole Commission, where presumptive durations depend on two
major factors: the seriousness-ranking of the crime and the statistical likelihood of recidivism. 2 1 Despite the theoretical differences
among these schemes, and possibly others that weigh the system's
purposes differently, they have one common virtue: They deal with
the purposes to be achieved, the factors to be considered in
sentencing decisions, and the suggested levels of penalties on a
systemwide basis. This is essential if even a modicum of consistency
is to be achieved.
ABANDONMENT OF A PRINCIPLED SOLUTION

Underlying the deficiencies of the "lockstep" procedure (and
perhaps also, the lack of substantive recommendations on the content of the guidelines), is the authors' judgment that principled solutions are unachievable and unnecessary. In explaining the rationale of the "lockstep" procedure, the report explains:
This book does not judge the merits of each sentencing goal. On
the basis of current knowledge, we have found that we can neither dismiss any of the goals as invalid nor embrace any one of
them as a panacea for present sentencing ills. Like many other
students of the sentencing process, we are uncertain as to what
does and does not work, what is right and what is wrong, and
what is necessary and what is unnecessary. 22
19.
20.

A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1.
See N. MoRus, supra note 1, at 74, 80; N. Morris, Punishment, Desert and

Rehabilitation 15 (Nov. 12, 1976) (bicentennial lecture presented at University of
Denver College of Law), reprinted in Senate Hearings,supra note 17, at 9306, 9323.
21. For the current guidelines of the United States Parole Commission, see 28
C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.38 (1978). For a description of how the guidelines were developed,
see D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILIKINS & P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND

SENTENCING (1978).

22. P. 44 (footnote omitted).
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In other words, since it is so difficult and controversial to decide
among the various purposes, the most practical solution is to seek
all four aims at once. 23
However, the issues of principle are not evaded so easily. By
ignoring them, the report does not achieve the "neutrality" which
it claims. Instead, it merely espouses, without analysis, a particular-and I believe mistaken-theory: that the various purposes of
punishment are cumulative or mutually reinforcing.2 4 Underlying
the "lockstep" procedure is the assumption that the offender
should receive as his or her sentence the amount of punishment
needed, respectively, to deter, incapacitate, rehabilitate, or denounce. The largest sentence assigned to any of these purposes becomes the offender's actual sentence, since it presumably encompasses all the relevant purposes.
But are the purposes really cumulative in this fashion? To the
extent there is tension among them, they are not. One crimecontrol aim may conflict with another: The best deterrent may be
counter-rehabilitative; and if it is, one must decide which of the
two aims is more important, as the report refuses to do. Still more
important are the tensions between the moral and crime-control
purposes. The book speaks of the denunciatory effects of punishment. If punishment does ascribe blame, then it is a requirement
of justice that the amount of punishment, and hence of implied
blame, be commensurate with the degree of blameworthiness of
the conduct.2 5 If a long prison sentence would effectively deter or
incapacitate, but would visit excessive censure on the individual
given the blameworthiness of his or her acts, one must confront
which purpose deterrence or incapacitation on one hand, or commensurateness of penalty to offense on the other-should be given
priority. If fairness requires that the latter be given preeminence,
then the aims are rio longer cumulative. How much weight should
23. P. 13.
24. See p. 52.
25. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 66-76. The report mentions the principle of
commensurateness-of-penalty-to-offense, but assigns it a peripheral role. The authors
propose that, in addition to deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and denunciation, the court should consider two penal purposes: Providing just punishment for
the offense and/or reflecting the relative gravity of the offense. Pp. 53-54; Proposed
Statute § 2302(b)(5), (6), p. 109. But the exclusion of these added factors from the
lockstep progression, the vagueness with which they are stated, and the absence of
any instruction on how much weight they should receive, would tend to minimize
their effect on sentencing decisions. Why the principle of commensurateness is given
so small a role in the report's sentencing scheme is never discussed.
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be given to this notion of commensurateness? The more weight it
is given, the more it restricts the other purposes-and thus the
more indefensible becomes the authors' assumption about the cumulativeness of the aims.
The authors justifiably emphasize the importance of parsimony
in punishing.26 Yet they seem unaware of the potential severity of
treating the four purposes as cumulative. Each purpose, considered
by itself, supplies reason for imprisoning in some cases and not imprisoning in others. Incapacitation gives reason for confining if the
offender is likely to recidivate, but for not confining if recidivism
is unlikely, irrespective of the gravity of the offense. "Denunciation" gives reason for confining if the crime is serious, but for not
doing so if the crime is relatively minor, irrespective of the likelihood of recidivism.
Similar reasoning holds for the other two aims, deterrence and
rehabilitation. If the four purposes are cumulated, however, an offender can be imprisoned if any one of the four purposes so mandates, even if imprisonment is inappropriate or unfair in light of
the three remaining aims. Heads or tails, the prisoner loses: If the
crime was not particularly serious but the prisoner supposedly can
be deterred or incapacitated or rehabilitated by a prison sentence,
he or she goes to prison; if prison serves none of these ends, but
the crime is allegedly serious enough to call for "denunciation," he
or she still goes in.
27
The assumption of cumulativeness thus seems mistaken. If
there are any counterarguments in its support, they would have to
be made explicitly. What cannot be justified is to do what the authors have done: simply adopt such a debatable penal philosophy
in the name of "neutrality" among philosophies.
PROSPECTS OF A PRINCIPLED SOLUTION

The authors' pessimism about reaching principled solutions
also seems exaggerated. True, the question of aims has been long
26. See, e.g., pp. 35, 38,40,41.
27. At one point, the report seems to suggest that lockstep serves chiefly to
help the judge decide whether to follow or depart from the guidelines: "[Elven with
a guideline system, the judge would still be required to engage first in the lockstep
progression procedure. He would then compare his conclusion with the recommended range to determine whether he finds the recommended guideline range
appropriate-the guideline range being presumptively applicable in most cases." P.
53. But if the assumption of cumulativeness is as conceptually flawed as this analysis
suggests, the lockstep procedure is of doubtful use for this comparison, since the
sentences derived from the process are themselves of questionable worth.
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and strenuously debated, but there are some considerations which
suggest that a rulemaking body such as a sentencing commission
could, if it gave enough effort to the task, develop a coherent conceptual model for its guidelines.
Rulemakers in some jurisdictions, despite the authors' pessimism, have been able to agree on a rationale. Oregon's parole reform law, passed in 1977, supplies a specific set of principles,
giving primacy to desert, which the parole board must follow in
setting its standards for duration of confinement.28 The new
California sentencing statute uses a somewhat similar rationale, 2 9
although the sentencing standards are set by the legislature itself.3
How well these schemes will work in practice, and what their specific problems are, remains to be seen. 31 Nevertheless, they
illustrate that it is not impossible to adopt a definite penal philosophy.
In addition, different conceptual models of punishment may
partially "overlap" (that is, yield similar results from different theories), thereby facilitating agreement. Compare, for example, the
model used by the United States Parole Commission in its
guidelines with a "deserts" model. Theoretically, there are important differences: The Parole Commission's model is derived from
28. See OR. REV. STAT. § 144.780 (1977). The statute provides that the parole
board's standards for duration of confinement be designed to impose "[plunishment

which is commensurate with the seriousness of the prisoner's criminal conduct." Id.
§ 144 .780(2 )(a). Deterrence and incapacitation may be considered, but only to the
extent "not inconsistent" with the requirement of commensurateness. Id. §
144.780(2)(b). The statute further states that the parole board, in setting its standards,
"shall give primary weight to the seriousness of the prisoner's present offense and
his criminal history." Id. § 144.780(3).
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170-.6 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); see also Cassou
& Taugher, supra note 2. The statute states that "the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment," CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1978), and
makes the severity of penalties depend primarily on the gravity of the offense. Id.
30. For criticism of California's choice of the legislature as the standard setter,
see A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, THE QUESTION OF PAROLE: RETENTION, REFORM OR ABOLITION? 83-86 (1979) [hereinafter cited as THE QUESTION OF PA-

A summary of this discussion appears in the executive summary of that report,
published as a monograph by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice under the title A. VON HIRSCH & K. HANRAHAN, ABOLISH PAROLE? (1978).
ROLE].

See also Foote, Deceptive DeterminateSentencing, in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETEMIINATE SENTENCING-REFORI OR

REGRESSION? 133 (1978); Messinger & Johnson, California's Determinate Sentence
Statute: History and Issues, in id. at 13.
31. Sheldon Messinger, Richard Sparks, and this author are now beginning an
LEAA-funded research project to evaluate the effects of the Oregon and California
systems. (Project on Strategies for Determinate Sentencing, NILECJ Grant Nos. 78NI-AX-0081, -0082).
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historical practice, and relies upon predictions of recidivism as well
as upon judgments about the seriousness of offenses; 3 2 a "deserts"
model, however, is developed from theoretical arguments about
fairness, looks to the gravity of the offender's criminal conduct, and
does not rely on prediction. 33 Yet it has been pointed out-by
Gottfredson, Wilkins and Hoffman in their recent book on parole
and sentencing guidelines 34-- that in practice there may be considerable congruence between the two models. They argue that this is
because the best (known) predictor of recidivism is the offender's
prior criminal history-which is also a factor in assessing the offender's blameworthiness (at least according to some proposed versions of the desert model 3 5).

How much congruence there actually is, and what tensions
still exist between the two models, is difficult to estimate since
there has been little discussion of precisely how a defendant's criminal history bears upon the two models. Nevertheless, to the extent
that potential overlap exists, it may facilitate compromise. The
members of a sentencing commission who prefer a desert-oriented
conception and those who advocate a role for prediction may be
able to agree, if their respective approaches lead to convergent results.
As for the three crime-control aims-deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation-there is empirical research that might
help the rulemaker. If, after debating the conceptual and moral issues, the members of the sentencing commission are still uncertain
whether and to what extent to give deterrence a role in deciding
the amount of penalties, it can be asked: "Can we measure deterrent effects sufficiently to warrant making deterrence such a decisive factor?" While the matter is not free from controversy, the
bulk of the evidence would suggest not. The best recent assessment of the state of the art, made by a panel sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences, reaches quite pessimistic conclusions
about our current capacity to measure the magnitude of deterrent
32. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978); see generally D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS
& P. HOFFMAN, supra note 21.
33. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 66-76, 124-31; see also J. KLEINIG,
PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); Harris, supra note 1.
34. D. GOTTFREDSON, L. WILKINS & P. HOFFMAN, supra note 21, at 136.
35. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 1, at 84-88. Some writers argue, however, that a

"just deserts" model should only consider the offender's current offense, and not his
or her past convictions; see, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 459-66
(1978).
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effects.3 6 Such research might help persuade the commission that
it is not feasible to base decisions about the amount of punishment
on its potential power to deter. The same would hold for rehabilitation as a major factor in determining the level of sentences, given
37
how little is known about effective treatment.
It still will not be easy, admittedly, to develop a coherent conception for the guidelines-as I myself have seen when attending
sessions where guidelines have been written. However, principled
solutions have been adopted in some places, and are not beyond
human capabilities. There is no reason to despair of even trying, as
the authors would have us do.

ABOLITION OF

PAROLE

RELEASE?

The report recommends elimination of parole release. An offender sentenced to prison would not be eligible for parole, and
would have to actually serve his or her full sentence, subject to a
brief, one-tenth reduction for good behavior. 38
Much of parole boards' traditional practice does seem indefensible today. There were no standards for parole release; the decision about the date of release was needlessly delayed; and, as the
authors argue, undue emphasis was given to rehabilitative and predictive notions of when the offender is supposedly "ready" for release.3 9
There are, however, defects that could be remedied. The
parole board could be required to adopt standards for its release
decisions, and to follow a rationale that stresses that decisions be
made on other than rehabilitative factors, such as the seriousness of
the criminal conduct. The board could be called upon to inform

36. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL PANEL ON RESEARCH ON DETERRENT AND
INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION 19-63 (A. Blumstein,
J. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978).
37. See, e.g., D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT (1975); Bailey, An Evaluation of 100 Studies of Correctional Outcomes, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 733 (2d ed.

N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang 1970); Greenberg, The CorrectionalEffects of
Correction, in CORRECTIONS AND PUNISHMENT 111 (D. Greenberg ed. 1977);
Robinson & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Programs, 17 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 67 (1971). For a critique of some of these studies, see Palmer,
Martinson Revisited, 12 J. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975).
38. P. 70.
39. Pp. 27, 68.
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the offender of his or her release date shortly after imprisonment
begins subject to subsequent postponement only if he or she is disruptive in prison. Oregon's new parole release statute requires the
40
parole board to do precisely these things.
If parole can thus be reformed, why should it be eliminated?
Before opting for its elimination, it is worth bearing in mind how
parole affects the way time in prison is calculated. There is now a
dual system of reckoning time. Judges are accustomed to imposing
lengthy sentences of confinement-which participants in the process do not expect to be carried out; which could not be carried
out given the limitations of prison resources; and which would be
disproportionately severe were they carried out. The parole board's
function-perhaps its most important practical role-is to assign
shorter actual durations of imprisonment. The prisoner who gets a
six-year sentence can, depending on the parole board's policy, expect to be paroled after two or three years.
Were parole release abolished, there would be a single reckoning: real time in prison. The judge's sentence would determine
the period actually served. This transition from the present dual
time to "real time," however, could easily give rise to misunderstanding. The appearance of a shift toward leniency can, be created,
even when there has been no change in the real quantum of punishment. Suppose the practice in a given jurisdiction has been to
give persons convicted of a given felony six years in prison, and to
parole them in most cases after about one-third of their sentence
has expired. Suppose parole is abolished, and a two-year presumptive sentence is prescribed in the standards for such conduct; little
actual change in the average stay in prison would result: it remains
at two years. However to most people accustomed to hearing sentences expressed in the old manner it will seem to be a large sentence reduction: two years instead of six. Explanations by the
sentencing commission of why there has been no real change may
well go unreported and unheeded, and there may be considerable
political pressure to raise the levels of prison time.
40. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 144.775(8), 144.780 (1977). For a description of the
rationale which the Oregon parole board must follow in setting its parole release
standards, see note 28 supra. The statute requires the board to decide, within six
months after the offender enters prison, his or her expected date of release. Id. §

144.120. This date may be substantially postponed if the board makes a finding that
the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison, as "serious misconduct" is

defined by the board. Id. § 144.125(2). For a fuller analysis of the Oregon law, see
THE QUESTION OF PAROLE, supra note 30, at 92-96.
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Is parole abolition, then, worth the risk? Conceivably, it might
be if sufficient precautions were taken. If a system of "real time"

sentences is created, the agency setting the standards would need
a clear directive that it adjust sentence durations downward to reflect that it is dealing with actual, not apparent, time in prison. For
example, the 1977 proposal of Senators Hart and Javits, which

eliminates parole and creates a Sentencing Commission to set the
standards, would set strict limits on the amount of confinement

which the commission is permitted to prescribe. 41 The bill that was
eventually passed by the United States Senate in early 1978,42 has
considerably weaker limits; 43 this is why I have argued elsewhere
against its provisions on parole abolition. 44 But it at least contains
45
some language that deals with the issue.

Which, then, is preferable: keeping parole release on a reformed basis, as Oregon has done, or eliminating it with appropri-

ate directions for scaling down sentences? I have tried to address
46
this rather complex question elsewhere.
One thing should be apparent, however. It would be poten-

tially disastrous to eliminate parole release without adding safeguards concerning the reckoning of sentence durations. Yet this is
what the present report would do. It calls for a system in which
judges impose nonparoleable "real time" sentences, but makes no
serious attempt to develop any mechanism that would reduce sentence durations to reflect that judges would now be dealing in real,
not apparent, time. 47 The dangers of a precipitous increase in
41.

S. 204, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). For analysis of this proposal and its

problems, see THE QUESTION OF PAROLE, supra note 30, at 83-86.

42. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
43. Section 124 of S. 1437 provides that the Sentencing Commission, in promulgating the guidelines for imprisonment, be guided by "the length of... terms
actually served, unless the Commission determines that such a length of term of
imprisonment does not adequately reflect a basis for a sentencing range that is consistent with the purposes of sentencing described in subsection 101(b)." S. 1437,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 124 (1978) (to be codified, if enacted, in 18 U.S.C. § 944).
Since § 101(b) includes virtually all the purposes of punishment, the escape clause is
a wide one, and almost any sentence length can be justified.
44. For an argument against the parole provisions of S.1437, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 101, 124 (1978) (to be codified, if enacted, at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2303 and 28
U.S.C. § 994), see Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House Comm. an
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1322 (1977-1978) (testimony of Professor Andrew von Hirsch).
45. See note 43 supra.
46. THE QUESTION OF PAROLE, supra note 30, at 83-86.
47. The authors' only suggested safeguard is to reduce by one-half the sentence
durations provided in S.1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), predecessor to S.1437. See p.
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prison time are evident. By ignoring the complexities involved in
eliminating parole, the authors, despite their talk of "parsimony," 48
have offered a formula for escalating imprisonments.

The report performs a valuable service in urging that there be
standards on how much punishment to impose, and in supporting
the idea of a specialized rulemaking body to help set them. However, its specific proposals-on how the standard-setting task
should be undertaken-seem to me to be flawed.
54. Since these durations are extremely high, such reduction provides little protection. The report compounds these difficulties by recommending that parole release
be abolished immediately, p. 55, before the sentencing commission has had time to
organize and issue its guidelines. During this interim, there would be virtually no
constraints on judges' imposing much longer durations of actual imprisonment.
48.

See, e.g., pp. 37-42.
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